The Key to Eurozone Stability Isn’t Monetary

The Eurozone debt crisis has raised important issues in the profession of economics. With regards to monetary integration much knowledge has been developed thanks to the crisis. Economist have virtually all rallied to the idea that  monetary unions exacerbate competitive imbalances. The Proof is in the widening gap of current accounts between the germanic like economies and the profligate periphery economies. Germany has never exported so much while the PIIGS have not suffered so much in a while. While the causes of the crisis are apparent to almost everyone (except maybe the Greeks) policy prescription differences abound. The prevailing view is to infuse massive amounts of liquidity into sovereign debt markets to stop the liquidity haemorrhage. The theory that the Eurozone is in a temporary liquidity crisis has strong proponents such as Paul Krugman or Roger Bootle. While Ireland has a strong growth profile and Italy does have a primary surplus that could justify monetary stopgap policies the problems of the other Euro profligates cannot be tidied over by temporary monetary measures because their issues are of a structural competitive order.

Once monetary policy impotence is accepted two policies approaches remain. The first is fiscal integration. A lot of economist advocate Euro bonds to alleviate market pressures on individual member finances. The obvious problems pertain to moral hazards. One of the causes of the crisis was that the reduction in sovereign interest rates because of decreased currency risk would induce profligacy. Such a phenomenon would be continued and compounded by Eurobonds. A fairness issue would also arise as lower debt countries would pay for the debt spending of others and AAA rated countries would actually pay heftier interest than they deserve. A problem in construction is also obvious. Eurobonds would be a substitute investment for sovereigns, unless Eurobonds replaced sovereigns entirely they would cannibalize demand for sovereigns and might actually help increase sovereign yields as German bunds have done to French Bonds today.

Instead of pooling liabilities to decrease individual sovereign risk, why not pool assets? This might be somewhat more palatable to German hawks. One way of pooling assets would be to federalize Unemployment Insurance. All members could pay into a fund that would back payments of insurance payouts. This would further effectively create an internal counter cyclical government spending stabilisation. As some states power ahead the transfers would automatically alleviate budgets in ailing economies. This already exists in Canada to great inter-provincial budgetary stability, the proof being that Quebec’s yields are at historical lows although the province has comparable debt levels to many PIIGS. Unfortunately as with all insurance schemes moral hazards subsiste, but the idea remains a good way to alleviate massive intra monetary union budgetary differences.

Fiscal integration however will not in the long term eradicate structural problems. The crux of the Eurozone problem is quite simply competitive differences. For a monetary union to survive in the long run productivity must balance out across its membership. Standardizing macro-prudential or regulatory frameworks across the zone is a good idea, but only when the policies standardized across the monetary union are good. Mis-regulation at a central level is worst than at the individual problem, imagine what the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis if everyone had emulated Greece or Spain’s policies. Diversity and regulatory competition is good so long as it leads to emulating of best practices. That countries aren’t emulating Germany is testament to political and not economic issues.

The only issue remaining is that of markets prevented from punishing political cultures conducive to bad policy. Greece has a political culture conducive to demagogy and fiscal populism. Markets are sending Greeks a message, “change your ways or suffer” that the European Union prevents this pedagogical process from unfolding is the real long term risk to Eurozone stability.

Here’s a Suggestion Mr Carney

The governor of the Bank of Canada Mark Carney has again continued to scold and give lessons to Canadians. He does this in his Monetary Policy Report of April 2012 where he reiterates some of the comments this blog criticized in a previous post. Those comments were that Canadian exporters needed to retool and refocus and that Canadian consumers needed to slow their pace of debt accumulation. The focus of the ‘retool, refocus and retrain’ mantra is largely advocated so as to increase Canadian firm’s ability to compete internationally and export. While this blog has already stated its objection to paternalistic economic communication from government institutions towards the private sector, this blog does accept Carney’s view that Canadian prosperity is underpinned by healthy trade numbers and international competitiveness. There is one criticism the Governor could have levelled that balances private sector independence and improved competitiveness, that critic should be less debt supply and it should be levelled at governments.

Talk of trade competitiveness unfortunately always boils down to currencies. In Canada manufacturers and commentators are always complain about the high Canadian dollar and how many jobs it kills. Leaving aside the fact that a high currency has as many benefits for a country as it has costs, a currency artificially above its equilibrium (or below it for that matter) is however  a concern. Let’s assume that the Canadian dollar is artificially overvalue, who might the culprit be for this imbalance? The Loonie isn’t a reserve currency so that can’t be it. Contrarily to McGuinty’s opinion oil isn’t to blame either. As the Central Bank report notes, Canadian oil is sold at a steep discount to certain international oil benchmarks, meaning that eastern Canada imports at high prices while the west exports at cheap prices, so the impact of higher oil prices only marginally affects the Canadian currency. In any case studies have refuted the claim of the Loonie being a petro-dollar. So who exactly is contributing to the Canadian dollar remaining above par with the US dollar?

To answer that question the certain economic facts need to be reviewed. Commentaries on trade and currencies often emphasize a restricted number of causes for currency fluctuations. Currency movements need to be understood in terms of foreign exchange market equilibrium. Every currency trade impacts the prevailing exchange rate but every trade does not just involve a quick speculation or an oil contract purchase. Much purchasing and selling of currencies involves savings diversification by institutional money managers. To give some colour to this point in 2007 before the crisis hit, foreigners shed roughly ~10 Billion of government paper while exporters sold just over 460 Billion dollars of exports. Since the beginning of the crisis over 400 Billion of Canadian government financial papers have been sold to foreigners. What does all this mean? Government budget surplus reduces the supply of government debt available to foreigners for purchase, a government deficit increases the supply. Since foreigners must buy Canadian dollars to purchase both export goods and government debt, Canadian governments’ profligacies are partially to blame for the high Canadian dollar. Part of their issuance of debt has been sold to foreigners increasing the demand for the Loonie and crowding out exports of goods and services.

Some might be tempted to point to Europe to refute these assertions. They would note Europe’s deficits have widened since 08 while the Euro has generally fallen. This is easily explained by sovereign risk. Canadian government debt is perceived to be a safe investment while much of the Euro area’s debts are considered very risky. Investors the World over generally prefer to buy Canadian debts than those from the PIIGS as they could be described as better quality products. Essentially Canada’s two most popular exports have now become oil and debt, small wonder manufacturing in Ontario can’t keep up. So if Mark Carney is so considered with the twin problem of profligacy and competitive weakness why isn’t he calling for Government austerity?

Drummond to Ontarians with Love

Don Drummond ex chief economist at the Toronto Dominion bank, the second largest in Canada, came out this week with a report this week on how Canada’s most populous province could tackle its mounting deficit. since most of my friends are neither Ontarians nor Canadian economic history buffs I feel that the significance of this past week’s event merits a little historical context.

Now this context starts somewhere around the 1800’s but bear with me for a while it won’t be that long. At the inception of Canadian confederacy political and economic clout were concentrated mostly into the two most populous provinces, Quebec and Ontario. These provinces were the bedrock on which Canadian economic growth rested and the springboard for much of Canadian political development. Around the mid 20th century Quebec relinquished its place as a driver for Canadian development leaving Ontario as the sole anvil on which the expansion of Canada could be forged. Business and industry migrated from Montreal to Toronto leading the latter to surpass the former in terms of population, economic output and general clout around the 70’s. As Ontario’s population soared the province became the capital for the financial industry and the center of canadian manufacturing. With its growing presence Ontario played the part of the peace broker in Canadian politics funding welfare programs across the country. 

That’s when things started changing. In the 90’s the cut in transfer payments from the federal government coupled with the pan-Canadian drive for budgetary surplus led to the Harris Year’s at Queen’s Park (unofficial name of the seat of Ontarian government). These years were marked by fiscal consolidation and labour wars with unions. Although mostly recognized as sensible policy actions by most non-union circles, the Harris years created a backlash which ushered in the McGuinty years. This conciliatory leader brought in accrued social spending, bought labour peace and spent his way to three election victories from 2003 till present. This unloosening of the public purse however led to a gaping deficit following the recession of 2009-10. So in 2011 facing an upcoming election and with plenty of deficit and debt accumulation to justify McGuinty called on Don Drummond a well respected economist to propose ways of reforming government expenditure and services to enable the province to return to budget balance by 2017-18 without raising taxes.

A year later here we are, and with the McGunity in government reduced to minority status the Drummond reports has just hit the shelves weighting in at ~320 proposals and 540 pages. To most observers the report while impartially worded comes in as a heavy rebuke to the years of government largess. The headline proposals are to get rid of some of the Premier’s pet projects like supporting alternative energies, all day daycare reform if not get rid of most forms of corporate welfare and finally to steal a page from the Harris playbook and start playing hard ball with the Province’s largest unions.

Unfortunately this is not Italy and the credit markets have not yet come for McGuinty’s profligate head… yet. Hence This technocratic gem of a report will certainly not become law. The government has already announced it will preserve the expensive all day daycare program. Most observers agree the prescription no matter how impartial, how well crafted or how sensible are politically unpalatable for the Liberal Government. So don’t expect Ontario to resume its role of Canadian growth engine anytime soon, much to the contrary expect Ontario to continue to be the drag on confederation it has been for the last 3-4 years, eating up equalization payments instead of funding them.

The picture is gloomy the report itself states that economic growth will not exceed the 2% mark for the foreseeable future and has also stated the deficit isn’t expected to shrink before reaching an all time high and federally comparable 30 Billion C$. So here’s my prediction McGuinty doesn’t fix the finances but let’s them continue on their gradual slide into PIIGS style irresponsibility. So expect to see a Montiesque kind of technocratic government coming in within the next decade to fix Ontario’s rivalry with Quebec for the most shoddily run provinces in Canada prize.

In praise of all that is German

Germany hasn’t been getting a lot of slack of late. Between accusations of trying to succeed where they’ve failed in two previous World Wars – dominating Europe – or accusations scuttling the European Project out of selfishness, and again with cries that Germany is abandoning the Euro, the nation of sauerkraut and beer is in the throws of a full blown Greek tragedy (lol pun intended). Asides from the on camera superficial Merkozy marriage, no french love seems to be crossing the Rhin. Further compounding the courteous hate fest, Italian flirting has gone from invitations to the bunga bunga parties (most often refused anyways) to the sober and stale Monti ear whispering for more cash. Somehow, I don’t think encouragements from the euro-sceptic nationalisty Finns was the recognition Berlin technocrats were looking for. The Euro area is eerily looking like an Animal Farm in the throes of its Orwellian infancy. Need I really specify which Euro countries are acting like over-eager egalitarian PIIGS, hrum I mean pigs, seeking the overthrow of opulent and oppressive markets, hrum… I meant masters. All punning aside, I believe there may be a little lack of balance in the debate over fiscal and monetary policy proposals to the Euro area mess.

Let’s start by awarding praise where it is due and sing the virtues of the German machine, hrum… economy sorry forgot about the inter-temporal analogy bank. To my knowledge German policymakers are the only ones of any major economy who seem to have learned the lessons of history. This is no coincidence as not-repeating the errors of history has become part of German culture. Little children are taught at school about the immeasurable harm generations of their ancestors have wrought upon the world (maybe even too zealously). A cursory look at the lessons young children learn from Dortmund to Munich, leaves the history amateur with a few residual lessons in economic virtue, that we shall survey here:

1) Inflation = bad. How so? Well inflation leads to economic inefficiencies most notable of which is the rise of unemployment, which then leads to socio-political problems we need not raise here. To see just how hawkish they are monetarily, read anything on the Bundesbank or even the ECB.

2) Trade competition = good (especially when your winning). How so? The best buffer when in hard times is to have a trade surplus and savings. Germany has been at the forefront of multilateral trade talks, especially in Europe (see European Union history) but also internationally. I guess Germans remember how bad Smoot-Hawley was for everyone and how good the life has been since… well… 1946 I guess.

3) Hard work = prerequisite to 2). Now I know this might sound sacrilegious to all of us westerners getting used to resting on the laurels of previous generations hard work but bear with me. Our current level of wealth is tied if anything to previous generations working hard, earning dough, not spending but saving dough in the bank account, that dough being magically transformed by the financial industry into fixed capital formation, a.k.a. every single piece of equipment, factory infrastructure that buttresses our current economies. If you didn’t follow the flow working harder than your living standard would entail serves as the anvil of tomorrows wealth. Germans get that, they preach it, than they actually do it. This saving/underspending/fixed capital forming needs to happen at the household level, the firm’s level and the governmental one.

4) Mash up all of the above = hawkishness in every sphere of public policy (and private actually) = kicking the worlds butt economically.

So what has been going on exactly in Europe? following the above stated framework for success lets see where things went wrong. Europe was a place of high savings (or at least American savings though the Marshall Plan)a, hard working and rebuilding for while following WWII. No problems so far. Italy, Britain and France had thriving industries, peripheral Europe slowly started democratizing itself. Than they started moving towards the European Union. Savings and investment flows started getting a little complex at this point. Big Euro countries started saving for peripheral ones, sending money so that those countries could invest in infrastructure modern

isation and other stuff of the like. Eventually thy took a bunch of countries with a myriad of fiscal and monetary systems and patched them together into a big currency block. Germany kinda knew where this was going so they tried the  true and tested policies. They retrenched further into fiscal and macro-prudential austerity. So yes this national savings craze as measured by a current account surplus peaking at 7.4% of GDP just before the crisis hit in 08, did lead to some imbalances within the Euro block by depressing Euro wide inflation numbers and interest rates. The real trouble however wasn’t German economic virtue it was the rest of Euro countries, more particularly the PIIGS, reaction to these circumstances. How did they react, like all good socialisty, humanisty, mushy hearted westerners, they indulged in profligate entitlement spending. Riding on the coattails of previous generations of hard work and contemporary German virtue (i know redundant), they offered their people an easy life at low borrowing costs.

Then one day the masters hrum… markets, sorry, woke up and said “the break is over back to work”. The current crisis boils down to looking to the Germans and saying no we don’t want to work as hard as you! keep paying. Unfortunately markets tend to act like the tough love parents that they are and Germany seems content to not act like the over-indulgent parent its savings temporarily were. Now some might quibble that the crisis is one of solvency or simply liquidity needing some temporary patching to be corrected. What needs correcting is peripheral Europeans expectation of living standards they must go down! if they are one day to go up to Germany’s level. Increasing the ESM or EFSF or introducing eurobonds does not solve the problem. Even Angela Merkel’s suggestion of limiting federal governments deficits to 0.5% of GDP remains to timide a goal. Mario Monti is somewhat on the right track in Italy. Although his reforms are limited in scale they are in the right direction. A combination of fiscal austerity coupled with market liberalization is the equivalent of putting italians back to work. Less play more labour! is the key to making labour unions howl and incidentally generating long-term wealth. Let’s hope more european nations decide to go the german path to prosperity before the s*** really hits the fan.

Cius