Could Carney Be Wrong

Mark Carney the Bank of Canada’s Governor has been one of the most vocal central bankers Canada has yet seen. He intervenes in the media often and repeatedly about some of his worries concerning the health of the Canadian economy. His chief worries revolve around three subjects broadly vassal to the theme of international competitiveness. The first of his worries is that Canadian manufacturers aren’t using the combination of low interest rates and high Canadian dollar to invest in cheap foreign capital goods. His second ”keep me up at night” issue is that of Canadian businesses’ low exposure to rapidly developing countries and over exposure to stagnant markets. His third problem and dilemma is that of rapidly escalating household debt load. While not explicitly saying so, Carney’s fear is that Canada will increasingly ressemble the pre-crisis US; a debt saddled and internationally uncompetitive economy. Commentators have been doing a fair bit of wall painting by noting that Canadian Households are second in indebtedness in the G7+BRIC category. Economic nationalists regularly plaster business newspapers with doomsday scenarios foreshadowed by Canada’s perennially lagging productivity. Alright, let’s breath… wait a minute and think about this.

It is a little funny that Carney’s most recent musings about Canadian manufacturers and business came less than a week after the latest numbers of the Canadian Survey of Business Investments . The survey’s data reveals that new capital expenditure (read fixed capital formation) is expected to run at the fourth highest clip in over two decades, only failing to surpass the dotcom bubble fueled investment mania at the turn of the millennium. One would have thought that the BoC Governor would have taken note of such a survey. It seems that manufacturers were just waiting for the Goldilocks’s moment of low interest rates, easy lending conditions and better international sales prospects to start investing. A traditional Canadian conservative way of doing business, one that served Canada’s financial sector well during the crisis. In any case with Chairmen Bernanke of the Fed’s pledge to keep interest rates near zero through 2014, Canadian manufacturers probably expect their low rates + high currency combo to persist a while longer, so what’s the big rush to invest? As noted above business investment isn’t our central bankers only preoccupation. Our aversion to developing nations export markets tick’s him off as well.

When it comes to Canadian exporters’ choice of export markets, I propose that bureaucrats who have never managed anything other than a hyped up economic think tank (say a central bank) or sovereign debt investment bank department (say at Goldman Sach’s), stay out of real businessmen’s head. When Mark Carney proposes exporters start doing business with emerging markets, which ones is he talking about? Is he talking about Russia? a country where ex-KGB mafia is indistinguishable from the oligarchical business class and where the contracts you sign are only as good as the prevailing mood of the Kremlin? Is he talking about Brazil? Brazil a country where if your company spills a drop of oil in the ocean your executives risk loosing their passports and being prosecuted by only thinly-veiled xenophobia infected local prosecutors. Maybe, he meant China? That very same country that will toss Rio Tinto executives in jail just to squeeze a better deal out of those executives’ native country and supposed business ally Australia. International business is a tough business in itself, why don’t we let those entrepreneurs that have first hand experience decide when they want to abandon the largest markets of the World (Japan, US and Europe) for some of the riskiest markets on Earth.

We’re left to examine the remaining entry on the Carney sin list. Our profligacy and lack of thriftiness. So Canadian household debt levels have jumped to never before seen heights. With interest rates at a historic low this is to be expected. The number however only gives an incomplete picture of Canadian households’ health. Household average debt says nothing about the distribution of that debt. In the US, the subprime crisis became a crisis because debtors were at or not far away from the bottom of the income distribution. In Canada most of the ongoing issuance of debt is for mortgages, and less than 9% of Canadians have less than 10% equity in their homes. If we add the two together it says that on average wealthy Canadians are the one’s increasing their average debt load, since homeowners that own a decent amount of home equity are generally well off. Something which makes sense as most wealthy Canadians do not need to indebt themselves to live, whether they choose to invest when their financing costs go through the floor is a whole other ball game. Maybe commentators want to come out with more data on the distribution of indebtedness in Canada before alarming national rate strategist.

The accusation that Canada is uncompetitive however is rooted in other numbers than simply those on indebtedness or exposure to this or that foreign market; it is rooted in the fact that on an aggregate level more Canadian workers working longer hours have not been producing as much. The US has seen its per worker productivity increase faster than Canada’s for much of the last few decades. Something that we should all be worried about in normal circumstances. Canada is not living in normal circumstances. Canada is in the midst of reallocating some of its labour and capital resources to a sector where it actually holds a comparative advantage. For the last few years Canada’s workers, corporations, entrepreneurs and capital markets have been investing time and effort in developing its valuable natural resources. There are very long lags between payoff and investment for some of Canada largest most capital intensive projects. The Business Investment Survey forecasts fixed capital formation in the resource extraction industries will beat the record set last year by $13 Billion dollars. For now this money creates little revenue, profits or exports but 3, 5, 10 years down the line expect to see GDP jump. Building Oil Sands steam assisted gravity drainage mines takes years, likewise BHP Billiton’s Jansen potash mine wont be operational for years. The Canadian mining landscape is only now starting to bubble, when it starts to boil those productivity numbers we spend so much time worrying about will become jokes. All in all Canada is shifting. The economic landscape we now see will not be the same. Mr Carney rest easy, Canada’s households and entrepreneurs have got this one under control.

Potash vs. Oil Sands, a policy dichotomy

With news of PetroChina International Investment Co. readying itself to be the sole owner of the undeveloped Mackay River in-situ project ~40 km Ouest of Fort McMurray, the question of Canada’s foreign takeover review scheme merits further attention than it’s been getting of late. The deal triggered by Athabasca Oil Sands Corp. owner of the remaining 40% stake not owned by PetoChina will lead to the latter buying the stake for an estimated $680 M Canadian dollars.

Now for those not aware, the Mackay river flows into the Athabasca river which itself flows into Athabasca Lake which outflows through Slave river and through a few national parks until the water system reaches its final destination in the North Arctic Sea. All that to say that the in-situ development finds itself in quite the environmentally sensitive region. Now, a foreign state owned company will be an environmental guarantor of the region. Why am I kicking up a fuss about this exemple of foreign Oil Sands ownership and not say, Statoil’s not far off operations. Is it maybe because Norwegians are something of green nuts while China is competing with Russia for most pollutated country in the World, maybe. Is it because Statoil is known for trying to maximize the return on Norwegian taxpayer dollar while PetroChina and other chinese primary ressource companies are known for attempting to distort markets for the gain of the motherland, probably.

The reason I raise this issue is because I personally disagreed with the Canadian federal government’s decision to oppose the BHP Billiton bid for Potash Corp of Saskatchewan, while I opposed the federal governments regulatory decision to allow PetroChina’s majority ownership and operating of Canadian natural ressource exploitations. So who between the Conservative government of Canada and myself is wrong while both hold seemingly inconsistent and paradoxical opinions? I’ll let you answer that once I’ve finished exposing my case.

Let’s start by raising a point that would seem to show inconsistency on behalf of the Government. The regulatory approval of PetroChina’s deal with Athabasca raised the feds no problem because it could only increase competition for the supply of Canadian Oil and increase the competition for demand in Canadian labour, win-win right? The decision to oppose the purchasing of Potash Corp. was one of opposing increased supply of Canadian potash (one of the worlds most popular agricultural fertilizers). Sudden policy shift or backtrack? Not really, here is a situation of two weights, two measures. Both ressources are considered ‘Strategic Ressources’ in Canada. However one is treated as a free market good while the other one is considered as legitimate producer collusion product, a.k.a. a cartel worthy product. In light of the Governments recent abolition of the Canadian Wheat Board monopoly, their previous decision to protect the Saskatchewan potash cartel seems strange. Or maybe it doesn’t after all Alberta (where most of the Oil Sands are) is traditionally pro-market whereas Saskatchewan is traditionally left-leaning. Does lobbying by Provincial governments really explain a difference in policies. The real difference lies behind the fact that Oil production is extremely geographically atomized, thus it’s trade is quite competitive, potash on the other hand can only be found in a few regions of the World. One of the regions richest in potash is western Canada. Essentially the difference is that Canadians can get away with cartel-esque behaviour in potash but not in oil.

This demonstrates that if the conservatives in Canada are not consistent in their policies it is not for lack of reflection of pragmatic economic solutions, simply inconsistent and un-ideological ones. So we actually have two very different decisions made for pragmatic reasons. That just means I will have to raise two different objections!

Regarding the BHP Billiton takeover of Potash Corp. blocking. The main reason for blocking the takeover was because of the aforementioned cartel in potash. In Saskatchewan the export of potash outside of NAFTA is undertaken by a corporation called Canpotex (short for Canadian Potash Exporters), which effectively operates as a cartel controlling over 30% of the worlds potash production. BHP would have broken up the cartel in order to produce at capacity and sell freely. The Provincial governments belief was that it would have lost royalty revenue from the drop in per unit profit. Whether the government would have actually registered a drop in revenues following the decision is aside from the point. It represents a stark intervention into markets which should be unacceptable in a modern democracy. A short list of consequences include, higher fertilizer prices for such poor farmers as those found in India or Africa, damaged Aussie-Canadian relations, reduced attractiveness of Canada as an investment destination and countless other immeasurable and unimaginable damages to Canada and the World.

Unfortunately one bad decision tends to follow another in politics, let’s now turn our attention to the regulatory decision that paved the way for a foreign power’s state owned corporation buying up ressources in Canada. As a fervent classical-liberal and staunch internationalist, I am all in favour for increasing developing nations and less than democratic nations participation in Global trade. I think there is no better way to improve their economic and socio-political prospects, than permitting them to join the WTO and partake in international trade. Although these beliefs push me to reflexively accept international takeovers, I believe there are a few caveats needed to smooth things out. First problem is the lack of reciprocity. Chinese companies benefit from industrialized nations legal systems when investing in the West. Western multinationals do not benefit from such property protection when doing business in China. Let’s help China, let’s show them some tough love by telling them they can buy our ressources when our companies will get some respect in China. An important issue is that state owned corporations do not necessarily seek to maximize profits as much as maximize socio-economic and political priorities of their governments, whereas public companies always seek to maximize profit for their shareholders. From the economic literature I believe it is most evident to all that maximizing profit in a competitive environment is the key to increasing global welfare.

It is hence my view that the Government’s Foreign Takeover Review process should be aimed at differentiating between those companies who will seek to maximize profit through increased productivity, the real key to increased wealth, and those companies who may have alternate motives such as shifting wealth from one geography to another (like state owned corporations). Blocking foreign State’s proxies from buying our ressources and encouraging public companies to invest is good policy. Let’s hope that when the Canadian federal government finishes its review of the takeover process that will be the ensuing conclusion.